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Abstract
The ability to share the other's feelings, known as empathy, has recently become the focus of social
neuroscience studies. We review converging evidence that empathy with, for example, the pain of
another person, activates part of the neural pain network of the empathizer, without first hand pain
stimulation to the empathizer's body. The amplitude of empathic brain responses is modulated by the
intensity of the displayed emotion, the appraisal of the situation, characteristics of the suffering person
such as perceived fairness, and features of the empathizer such as gender or previous experience with
pain-inflicting situations. Future studies in the field should address inter-individual differences in
empathy, development and plasticity of the empathic brain over the life span and the link between
empathy, compassionate motivation and prosocial behavior.
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Summary 
The ability to share the other’s feelings, known as empathy, has recently become the 
focus of social neuroscience studies. We review converging evidence that empathy with, 
for example, the pain of another person, activates part of the neural pain network of the 
empathizer, without first hand pain stimulation to the empathizer’s body. The amplitude 
of empathic brain responses is modulated by the intensity of the displayed emotion, the 
appraisal of the situation, characteristics of the suffering person such as perceived 
fairness, and features of the empathizer such as gender or previous experience with pain-
inflicting situations. Future studies in the field should address inter-individual differences 
in empathy, development and plasticity of the empathic brain over the life span and the 
link between empathy, compassionate motivation and prosocial behavior.    
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Introduction 
Humans spend a considerable amount of their lives in the company of others, and 
understanding the feelings of others and their intentions towards us is crucial for 
appropriate behavior in our social environment. The intriguing question how we 
understand the other person’s mind and how this is reflected in our own neural state has 
been addressed by a number of recent neuroscience studies. Accumulating evidence has 
put forward the view that there are at least two different routes to put us in the shoes (the 
mind) of the other person [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. One route is to share the other person’s 
feelings in an embodied manner, known as empathy (note that a similar embodied 
simulation was first observed in the domain of motor actions in the monkey [7, 8] and 
human [9] brain). The other route is to cognitively infer about the state of the other 
person, known as “theory of mind” [10], “mentalizing” [11], “mindreading” [12], or 
“cognitive perspective taking”. Although often occurring in concert, findings from 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies suggest that understanding others 
based on cognitive perspective taking and based on empathy recruit different neural 
networks. 
Neural correlates of cognitive perspective taking have been reviewed elsewhere 
[13, 14]. In these studies, participants are typically asked to take the perspective of a 
person shown on a cartoon or described in a story. Brain regions activated by cognitive 
perspective taking include medial prefrontal regions, the superior temporal sulcus (STS), 
extending into the parietal lobe (temporo-parietal junction), sometimes also the temporal 
pole (Figure 1). Empathizing with another person has been shown to be related to 
different neural networks, mostly including somatosensory and insular cortices as well as 
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limbic areas and anterior cingulate cortex. Empathy for pain, for example, predominately 
correlates with activation in the anterior insula (AI) and anterior cingulate (ACC).  
The distinction between cognitive perspective taking and empathy is supported by 
preliminary evidence from studies of patients with marked social deficits, such as autism 
or psychopathy. It has been shown that patients with autistic spectrum disorder have a 
deficit in cognitive perspective taking [15], which might be related to decreased gray 
matter concentration in the STS region [16]. In contrast, psychopaths seem to have no 
impairment in cognitive perspective taking, enabling the characteristic manipulative 
behavior [17]. However, recent studies showed reduced grey matter volume in AI and 
amygdala, whereas reduced volume in AI correlating to the degree of observed 
aggressive behavior and empathy in adolescents with conduct disorder [18] and reduced 
activity in AI and amygdala in psychopaths [19], which might be related to deficits in 
emotion processing [6, 17] and empathy.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
In this paper we review recent neuroscientific findings on empathy. First, we define 
empathy to provide a conceptual framework. Second, we give an overview of paradigms 
developed to assess empathy with neuroscientific methods, and summarize the main 
results. A third part focuses on factors which modulate empathic brain responses, and a 
final part on inter-individual differences in empathy.  
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What is Empathy? 
The term empathy is widely used in social and developmental psychology, care-
giving settings, sociology and philosophy, and has been defined in many different ways 
[20, 21]. From a neuroscientific perspective, it is important to demarcate empathy from 
cognitive perspective taking, based on the different neural networks for empathy and 
cognitive perspective taking outlined in Figure 1 [3]. We refer to cognitive perspective 
taking as the ability to understand intentions, desires, beliefs of another person, resulting 
from (cognitively) reasoning about the other’s state. In contrast, we refer to empathy as 
an affective state, caused by sharing of the emotions or sensory states of another person.  
Moreover, empathy is distinguished from sympathy [21] (also referred to as 
empathic concern [22]) or compassion. An affective state elicited by empathy is 
isomorphic with the other’s state, which is not the case for sympathy or compassion [21]. 
Further, empathy is not necessarily linked to a prosocial motivation, i.e., the concern 
about the others well-being, whereas there is such a link from sympathy or compassion to 
prosociality [21, 22, 23]. Empathy can have a dark side, for example when it is used to 
find the weakest spot of a person to make her or him suffer, which is far from showing 
compassion with the other. It is suggested that empathy has to be transformed into 
sympathy [21] or empathic concern [22, 23] in order to elicit prosocial motivation. To our 
knowledge, however, the link between empathy and prosocial behavior has not been 
explored in depth yet. 
Lastly, empathy has to be separated from emotional contagion. An empathic 
person is aware of the fact that his or her own affective state is vicariously elicited by the 
state of the person he or she emphasizes with [3]. Emotional contagion might be a 
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precursor of the development of a capacity for empathy [24], but is not considered an 
empathic response, because the person incorporates affective states of another person, 
without being aware that it is not its own feeling. 
 
Neural correlates of empathy 
The majority of neuroscience studies on neural correlates of empathy have 
addressed empathy for pain perceived in another person [25*, 26**, 27, 28, 29**, 30, 31, 
32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41]. Two fMRI studies by Singer and colleagues [32, 
33] investigated empathy ‘in vivo’ with an interactive empathy for pain paradigm. In this 
paradigm, the volunteer in the fMRI scanner receives either pain herself or perceives pain 
in another person, delivered via pain electrodes at the back of the volunteer’s or the other 
person’s hand. The other person is sitting next to the fMRI scanner and a mirror system 
allows the participant inside the scanner to see her own as well as the other’s hand lying 
on a tilted board. Differently colored flashes of light on a screen behind the board point to 
either the volunteer’s or the other person’s hand, indicating which of them would receive 
painful and which would receive non-painful stimulation. This procedure permits to 
measure pain-related brain activation when pain is applied to the scanned volunteer (felt 
pain) or to her partner (empathy for pain). An early study [32] used this paradigm to 
assess empathy in couples. Here, the female partner was the volunteer in the scanner, 
receiving pain herself or perceiving her husband suffering from pain. The results suggest 
that parts of the so-called “pain matrix” – bilateral anterior insula (AI), the rostral anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) (Figure 2a), brainstem, and cerebellum – were activated when 
she experienced pain herself as well as when she saw the arrow cue indicating that her 
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husband had experienced pain. These areas are involved in the processing of the affective 
component of pain, that is, how unpleasant the subjectively felt pain is. Thus, both the 
experience of pain to oneself and the knowledge that the other person is experiencing 
pain activates the same affective pain circuits, suggesting a neural simulation of the 
suffering of the other person, in absence of pain stimulation to our own body [see 44 for a 
review]. A more recent study [33] with the interactive empathy for pain paradigm showed 
that empathic brain responses in AI and ACC are not restricted to a beloved partner, but 
also occur when an unknown, but likeable person is in pain.  
FMRI studies on empathy for pain in which participants viewed pictures or videos 
of painful unknown faces [29**, 31] or body parts in painful situations [26**, 27, 28, 30, 
34, 37, 41, 43] (Figure 2b) have revealed a similar pattern of results, emphasizing that 
neural simulation of the pain of another person occurs independently of the affective link 
between the empathizer and the person in pain.  
In most fMRI studies, effects of empathy for pain have been predominately found 
in AI and ACC [26**, 27, 28, 29**, 31, 32, 33, 37, 41, 43]. AI and ACC are also 
involved in general emotional processing [39] and the affective processing of pain [40] in 
non-empathy conditions, i.e, under conditions of “first hand” experience of the emotion 
or sensation. This supports the assumption that empathizing with a specific emotion or 
sensation of the other activates the neural network underlying this specific emotion or 
sensation in the empathizer.  
Recent studies have shown that such empathic “simulation effects” can also be 
found in other brain regions. Studies using magnetoencephalography (MEG) [38] and 
somatosenory evoked potentials (SEP) [25*] have revealed that empathy for pain in 
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others also modulates components of brain activity which are generated in primary (SI) 
and secondary (SII) somatosensory region, i.e., areas related to “flesh-and-bone” 
experience of pain. Further, muscle-specific motor-evoked potentials (MEPs), induced by 
transmagnetic stimulation (TMS), were inhibited when participants watched a needle 
penetrating a specific muscle [35, 36]. In line with these findings, a recent fMRI study by 
Lamm and colleagues [41] showed empathy-related activation in contralateral SI when 
participants focused on the intensity of pain felt by the other person.    
Neural simulation of the other’s state or feelings is not restricted to empathy for 
pain. Empathic responses in other domains involve brain structures, which are recruited if 
those other specific emotions or sensations are self-experienced. There is, for example, 
evidence that the observation of touch and the first hand experience of touch activate 
similar regions in secondary somatosensory cortex [45]. In another recent study, 
participants watched video clips showing people sampling pleasant and unpleasant tastes, 
and then experienced the different tastes themselves [46*]. Jabbi and colleagues [46*] 
found neural activation in anterior insula cortex when people passively watched disgust 
in another person, and when they were disgusted themselves [see also 47]. It is still an 
open question whether there are shared activations in self and others in domains like joy 
or sorrow. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
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Modulation of empathy 
 The results reviewed above indicate that our brain is set up to simulate the 
feelings of others, i.e., to empathize. However, from our own experience we know that 
we empathize with others to varying degrees. Recent studies have assessed factors 
modulating empathic brain responses. One first factor is the intensity of the stimulation or 
displayed emotion. Saarela and colleagues [31] manipulated the intensity of perceived 
pain in others by presenting faces of patients being in chronic or acute pain (Figure 2a). 
The results showed stronger activations in AI and ACC when participants empathized 
with people in acute pain as compared to chronic pain. In a study by Avenanti and 
colleagues [36], participants perceived a needle deeply penetrating body parts of a human 
model, rated as high intensity of pain, or just scratching the surface of the skin, rated as 
low pain intensity. Empathy-related inhibition of muscle evoked potentials, following 
TMS, were found in the high intensity condition, but not in the low intensity condition 
[36]. A second modulating factor are features of the empathy target, for example the 
person being in pain. One recent study showed that empathic brain responses in men but 
not women were significantly weaker when the person in pain was judged as unfair, as 
compared to a person seen as fair and likable [33] (Figure 2c).  As a third factor, the 
situational context was found to modulate empathy. Empathic brain responses were 
reduced when participants were convinced that the other received pain as a therapeutic 
mean and the therapy was successful rather than in vain [29**]. Moreover, empathic 
brain responses are modulated by attention. Observing pictures or cartoons of hands in 
painful situations (Figure 2b, lower panel), participants showed stronger activation in AI 
and ACC when they focused on the intensity of the other’s pain as compared to when 
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they were asked to count the number of hands, i.e., shifting attention away from the 
other’s pain [27]. Finally, characteristics of the empathizer were found to affect the 
strength of empathic brain responses. Cheng and colleagues [26**] showed animated 
pictures of needles, being inserted in different body parts, to physicians who practice 
acupuncture, and to naïve participants. The results revealed less empathy-related pain 
activity in AI, ACC and regions of interest in the somatosensory cortex in the physicians 
as compared to the control group, indicating a reduction of empathic brain responses if 
the empathizer is frequently exposed to pain-inflicting situations. Another recent study 
[42] used laser-evoked potentials (LEP) and had participants observe painful or non-
painful stimulation of another person while suffering from pain themselves. The results 
showed that the N1/P1 component, probably generated in a region corresponding to SII, 
was modulated by the rating of the self pain, rather than the pain of the other person. This 
led the authors to conclude that empathizers in pain bias their neural empathic responses 
in a self-centered manner [42]. Moreover, difficulties in identifying and describing own 
feelings and bodily sensations, known as alexithymia, were found to correlate with a 
reduction of empathy [48, 49]. Moriguchi and colleagues [48] had participants watch 
hands and feet in painful situations. They reported reduced activation in ACC, 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and cerebellum, accompanied by low scores in empathy 
questionnaires, for participants categorized as high alexithymic as compared to a low 
alexithymic control group.  
 
Inter-individual differences in empathy  
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Apart from the factors modulating empathy summarized above, there is evidence 
for inter-individual differences in empathic brain responses. Such inter-individual 
differences in neural empathy responses were found to correlate with behavioral trait 
measures of empathy in empathy questionnaires such as the Empathic Concern Scale of 
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, 50) and the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale 
(BEES, 51) [32, 33]. The higher subjects scored on these questionnaires, the higher their 
activation in AI and ACC. Interestingly, Jabbi and colleagues [46*] observed similar 
correlations between IRI subscales and empathic brain responses in the AI for 
participants who had observed others tasting pleasant or unpleasant drinks associated 
with facial expressions of joy or disgust alternatively. Empathic brain responses are not 
only positively correlated with trait measures of empathy, but also with unpleasantness 
ratings given online after each trial of an empathy-inducing condition [29**, 31, 43]. 
Future research will have to clarify where these individual differences in empathic brain 
responses stem from and whether and how they predict sympathy and compassion, which 
then might explain individual differences in prosocial behavior. 
 
Conclusion 
Recent neuroscience studies have given insights into brain regions related to 
empathy, in particular to empathy for the suffering of another person. The results indicate 
that empathy with feelings of the others, and self-experience of this feeling state recruit 
shared neural networks, suggesting a simulation of the other’s state in the brain of the 
empathizer. The strength of the empathic brain responses can be modulated by a variety 
of factors, including the intensity of the displayed emotion, contextual appraisal, features 
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of the empathizer and of the target of empathy. The reviewed findings have substantially 
contributed to the understanding of the neural underpinnings of empathy. At the same 
time, they are a stepping stone for the investigation of important issues in future studies. 
One first interesting question concerns the basis of inter-individual differences in the 
ability to emphasize. Plausible sources of inter-individual variation in empathy might be 
genetic, environmental or developmental factors, none of which has been sufficiently 
investigated in the context of neuroscientific empathy research. A second big issue is the 
link between empathic brain responses and sympathy or compassion, i.e., feeling as and 
feeling for the other. Thirdly, it is an open question how empathic brain responses relate 
to prosocial motivation and behavior and finally, almost nothing is known about the 
plasticity of the empathic brain, that is, about the trainability of empathy and 
compassionate motivation, all issues which should have considerable practical impacts on 
society.   
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Schematic overview of brain regions typically involved in understanding others 
based on Cognitive Perspective taking (green) and empathy (orange); the latter  
measured in the domain of empathic brain responses to pain, disgust, taste and 
touch. MPC = medial prefrontal cortex; ACC = anterior cingulate cortex; AI = 
anterior insula; SII = secondary somatosensory cortex; TP = temporal poles; STS = 
superior temporal sulcus; TPF = temporo-parietal junction. 
 
Figure 2. Results and example stimulus material of empathy for pain studies. a. 
Overlapping brain regions activated for the first-hand experience of pain and the 
perception of pain in the other person (empathy for pain; modified from Singer and 
colleagues [29]) ACC = anterior cingulate cortex. b. Examples of painful faces 
([28] with kind permission from M. Saarela), and pictures and cartoons of body 
parts in painful situations (top, [36] with kind permission from C. Lamm; bottom 
[24] with kind permission from S. Han) used to investigate empathy for pain. c. 
Empathic brain responses are modulated by a number of factors. For example, men 
did not show empathy-related activation in the anterior insula when a person in pain 
was perceived as unfair (modified from Singer and colleagues [30]). 
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